The events that followed the collapse of the communist regime in Afghanistan have become the subject of great importance both within the Afghan and Muslim community around the world. The subsequent disheartening events that entangled Afghanistan and Mujahideen in a web of everlasting warfare, conspiracies, contempt were all in an attempt to discredit the concept of Islamic Jehad and the establishment of a model Islamic government in Afghanistan.

The onslaught of biased propaganda by the Western news agencies were all directed against the Mujahideen to create an atmosphere of mistrust both within the Mujhideen ranks and their leadership on one side, and the greater Muslim Ummah on the other-in order to achieve their twin goals of subverting the Islamic revolution in Afghanistan, and discrediting Islamic movements within Muslim communities which were vying for the establishment of Islamic government.

The history of subsequent events that followed its course has been greatly exaggerated and tremendously distorted by the media and the protagonists of the coalition government in Kabul and subsequently by the Taliban. The events of the last six years have been distorted so much so that it requires a rendition of the actual events that occurred without any bias or distortion of the facts.

This composition is the precise and most concise chronology of the events that has happened since the collapse of the communist regime in Afghanistan. We will be leaving our readers to comprehend and discern the information provided in order to recognize the real culprits behind the tragedy that struck Afghanistan ever since.

PART I

In the last days of Najib's government the situation in Afghanistan were the following:

1. The financial and military aide by the Russians were cut off.
    
2. The capital, Kabul was besieged by the mujahideen forces.
    
3. The prices of foods stuff, goods, fuel oil and other commodities were skyrocketing beyond people's proportion.
    
4. The Kabul regime was unable to meet its financial obligations to the military -- and were running low on fuel oil to its military machine.
    
5. The military was totally dismantled, and in its place the militia forces which were acting like the mercenaries had filled the vacuum.
    
6. The government military forces had lost morale and differences within the communist party started taking a serious turn.
    
7. Within the communist party differences were emerging over the future of the country. One of the faction of the communist party was willing to transfer the power to the mujahideen government based on the arrangement that have been worked out by the United Nations. On the other hand the other faction wanted to form a coalition government with some mujahideen elements.
    
8. After the idea of formation of a coalition government proved fruitless, Najibullah declared his support for the transfer of power to a government acceptable to all the parties in the Afghan imbroglio. Najib, made his intention known to the public on Wednesday March 18th, 1992. However, the followers of Babarak Karmal in the Kabul administration such as Abdul Wakil, Mahmud Baryalai, (Barbrak Karmal's brother) General Nabi Azimi, General Asif Dilawar were conceding to form a coalition government with some mujahideen elements excluding Hezb-I-Islami Afghanistan. The actual military power resided with this faction which had the support of the notorious militias and the remnants of the armed forces.
    
9. The attempted assassination of General Dostum, and Najibullahs' attempt to remove his opponent from the scene were foiled-thus Najibullah was forced to relinquish his power on April 14, 1992.
    
10. After the resignation of Najibullah on April 14, 1992, the entire machinery of government in Kabul came under the direct control of the supporters of Babrak Karmal. They began reinforcing the city's' defenses by bringing fresh troops from their coalition partners from northern Kabul, with whom they had already reached a compromise over the future government in Afghanistan. The reinforcement of the Kabul began at earnest on Sunday March 3, 1992.
     
11. The communist government in Kabul began issuing directive to their civilian employees and military forces in the provinces to join in coalition with those Mujahideen elements with whom they have reached a compromise. They advised their agents to turn over the cities even to the weakest Mujahideen group in the provinces where Hezb-e-Islami was the strongest and poised to liberate these cities in the event of collapse of regime in Kabul. They were strictly advised not to surrender to Hezb-e-Islami in any case.
     
12. Meanwhile, in the coalition front the decision making body comprised of the Shurai Nazar, Shiaii Hezb-e-Wahdat Islami, supporters of Barbrak Karmal, General Dostum and the Ismaili faction of Said Mansour Naderi. In this coalition the weakest group militarily was Shurai Nazar of Masoud.
     
13. According to the agreed terms the control of the cities, highways and military power would be residing with the military forces of the communist regime. The terms of agreement also included the fusion of political parties into the civil administration of the government.
     
14. The plan had the blessing of one the neighbors of Afghanistan -- this country was actively promoting the coalition group and playing a major role in its fruition.
     
15. Hezb-I-Islami, on the other hand was actively promoting the idea of a transitional government acceptable to all of the parties in the conflict -- the transition of power to the interim government; and the holding of elections for an elected government after the six month mandate of the interim period. The purpose of the plan was to convince the Mujahideen groups not to engage the formation of coalition government with the communists; or to try to aquiver the government through a coup-detate with the communist party of Afghanistan. Instead, they should support the proposition for the formation of an interim government from those individual that are acceptable to all Jehadi forces - and that they should agree that the only way the Mujahideen leaders would be assuming any post within the government would be only after they have been elected by the people in the general election. Hezb-e-Islami was of the opinion that convening of general election and the formation of an elected government is the only way to avert the misfortune of a coalition government with the communists, or the misfortune of anarchy and chaos in the country.
     
16. All the forces that were worried about the idea establishment of an Islamic government in Afghanistan by the Mujahideen, were conspiring to either form a coalition government of the communists and some mujahideen elements; or if that fails then they should try to establish a coalition government consisting of the nationalists, and the figures that are acceptable to the Western powers. Hezb-I-Islami rejected the plan and instead proposed the following:
    
     
    1. Najib should resign.
        
    2. The Mujahideen groups should agree on the formation of an interim government acceptable to all of the Mujahideen groups. The figures making this transitional government should be either from the Mujahideen groups, or those individual that do not directly belong to the either of the Mujahideen groups- but are individual that are good practicing Muslims and that they are not tainted by any means.
        
    3. The militia forces that makes the bulk of the military machines of the communists should be disbanded and their weapons transferred to the military forces.
        
    4. The security of the Kabul City should be transferred to the police forces.
        
    5. Power should be transferred to the interim administration peacefully.
        
    6. General election should be held within a six month time period.
    
     
17. All of the Mujahideen leaders except Sayyaf and Maulavi Khalis accepted the plan, and a copy of the draft, which included a list of the names accepted to the Mujahideen, were set to the special UN envoy for Afghanistan Mr. Benwon Sevan. According to the plan an interim government was to replace the communist regime in Kabul and the power were to be transferred peacefully.
     
18. The leaders of the Jamiat-e-Islami after agreeing to plan signed the agreement on Wednesday 4th of April 1992. However, the Jamiat leadership on Monday April the 30th reversed its stand from the agreed terms after the communist Generals put their support behind Jamiat-e-Islami Afghanistan. The Jamiat leadership was insisting on the establishment of an interim Mujahideen government made up of Mujahideen leaders.
     
19. The change in the attitude of Prof. Rabbani was obvious. He wanted the inclusion of the Mujahideen leadership in the interim period - since the terms and conditions of a coalition government with the communist elements were already agreed upon by the two side; by bringing the Mujahideen leaders he would be securing their consent to such a coalition administration and the position offered within the administration would be dubbed as positions agreed upon and consented by all the Mujahideen parties.
     
20. Najib proposed that since Hezb-e-Islami is the largest Mujahideen party, as such the party will be given a bigger share in the government and its leader Hekmatyar will be embraced as an elder brother by his administration, therefore; the Afghanistan problem shall be solved by the compromise between Hezb-e-Islami and the Watan (National) party. This compromise will result in the solution of the crisis in the country, and consequently the need for the compromise with the other Mujahideen groups will not be required. The Hezb-e-Islami adamantly rejected the offer and instead stated that the need for a compromise between the communists and the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, has been permanently severed, and that the communist instead of compromise should take the advantage of the national amnesty offered by the Mujahideen, and that they should transfer the power without any pre-conditions. Najibullah, even five days prior to his departure from power once again proposed to Hezb-e-Islami that "the Watan party being the largest party in the country with 500,000 members is capable of solving the crisis in the country by establishing a coalition government with the other major party to the conflict the Hezb-e-Islami." Najib, at he end of his proposals once again reiterated that if Hezb-e-Islami decides to reject the offer then "we will be forced to take drastic actions which shall have serious and negative consequences to the Hezb-e-Islami." He further reiterated, "We will be then transferring the power either to the former King Zahir Shah, or someone else who could be the source of major crisis in the country, and as a result all the responsibility for the future turn of events should be squarely lying on the shoulders of Mr. Hekmatyar."
     
21. As a result of refusal of Hezb-e-Islami to form a coalition government in Kabul, the Kabul administration on Wednesday the 24th of April 1992, as a last ditch effort to persuade Hezb-e-Islami to the formation of a coalition government sent a delegation lead by General Raffi (the then vice president of Afghanistan) to meet brother Hekmatyar at his headquarter in Logar province. The purpose of his mission was to scout the possible solution put forward by the Hezb-e-Islami, and then to present that to the executive council in the government for discussion. General Raffi after his arrival in Kabul and his subsequent discussion with the members of the executive council, told the government controlled television and radio that almost all members of the council were supportive of the plan presented by Hekmatyar. He added they accepted the plan in order to eliminate the possibility of an immediate attack on Kabul.
     
22. Hezb-I-Islami after an arduous and consistent effort to persuade the Mujahideen leaders of an impending conspiracy by the communists and other enemies of Islam was forced to take action. The collusion of the communist generals with the Jamiat-e-Islami on a coalition government and the movement of militia forces along with some of the Massouds forces into the city was changing the dynamics of situation as the hours were going bye. Brother Hekmatyar the Amir of Hezb-e-Islami was forced to leave his headquarter in Peshawar for Afghanistan on Friday April 17, 1992. Subsequent to his entry in Afghanistan he issued a directive to his Mujahideen to foil the conspiracy against Islam and Mujahideen in Afghanistan. He ordered his forces to take over the control of cities from the communists and move their forces towards Kabul to force the communist generals to give up the idea of coalition government and surrender the power to the Mujahideen without any strings attached.
     
23. On the other hand Hezb-e-Islami declared that the communist rulers in Kabul should relinquish their power to the Council (Shura) of Mujahideen commanders around Kabul by April 27, 1992. This council was to take over the interim administration of the country and to pave ways for the establishment of an elected government through a general election to be held within the six months and the transfer of power to that government. If the communist rulers did not meet these conditions then Hezb-e-Islami would be forced to move in to the capital and remove the communists from power and foil the conspiracy.
     
24. The communist rulers in Kabul, after witnessing the advancement of Hezb forces towards Kabul, were forced to send a delegation headed by General Raffi on April 22, 1992, to brother Hekmatyars' headquarters in Logar province. The purpose of the trip was to take the Hezb proposals and presented that to the ruling council in Kabul. After his return to Kabul General Raffi told the Radio and Television reporters that the ruling council in Kabul have agreed to the terms presented by Hekmatyar in an attempt to avert bloodshed in Kabul. If there were no intention of forming a grand alliance between the communists and some of the Mujahideen elements, then power would have been transferred peacefully to the Council of Mujahideen commanders in and around Kabul and the whole tragedy averted.

To be continued...

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