Selected Books
Turkey in Europe & Europe in Turkey
Turgut Özal

Conclusion

"The past reveals to the present only what the present is capable of seeing."
R. H. Tawney

Now is the time of vast nations. Today's Europe, which is a group of individual countries, can only be an intermediate stage between the nation-states of the past and the single European State of the future. This surely is the final goal, and is the only guarantee of Europe's security and well-being.

Until now the process of peaceful integration, which demands mutual persuasion, conciliation, and harmony, has developed slowly, with intermittent periods of crisis occurring as difficulties have arisen. Each crisis brings the danger of a split, but equally it can be the opportunity to go further in the direction of integration. The only thing not to do in a crisis situation is to remain in the status quo. Up to the present every crisis has ultimately served as a springboard for progress. We believe that the same will still be true in the future.

We want to take our place in European integration. To this end we have already made our application. It may therefore be appropriate at this stage to explain what kind of European integration we have in mind.

Economic integration is by itself a limited objective. It is important in that it prepares the ground for the politico-security integration of Europe. In view of the increasing integration of the world economy, European economic integration should be somewhat more profound and intense. Nevertheless, it will hardly be a sufficient condition to make Europe a distinct entity on a sustained basis. `A market of 320 million consumers who agree to relinquish their national sovereignty in return for an increase in their living standards-an aggregate of interests deprived of spirit and common projects, hence incapable of producing a will and a culture, a gathering of passive subjects. . . cannot represent in the world other than the triumph of consumerism.

At the other end of the spectrum lies the spectra of a multinational order in the model of the Austro-Hungarian Empire or something similar. This nostalgic alternative would necessitate a dominant people around whom Europe would be politically reorganized. If European history is any guide, this could be a fiction rather than a plausible reality.

Programmatically, one can claim that Europe will take shape in accordance with the nature of the responses she will have to elaborate to the major problems of our era, namely new technologies, ecology, drug-addiction, delinquency, and the perennial question of reconciling economic efficiency with social justice. But these problems are of a universal nature and the possible solutions to them are bound to be highly uniform in the industrialized world.

Historically speaking, foreign policy has always been instrumental in establishing the distinctiveness of a polity. The dilemma here is which comes first. Besides, we are fast approaching a world in which there is no apparent enemy worth the name. This does not mean that history based on struggle for power and interest will soon come to an end. However, given the level of dependence of individual countries on the present world economic order and the waning importance of ideologies in international affairs, a differentiated foreign policy, unless artificially accentuated, hence self-defeating, could not decisively contribute to creating a distinct political entity.

Moreover, foreign policy is the expression of the political will which can emerge only out of a culture in a broad sense of the word. At present, `political Europe and cultural Europe seem to be locked in a vicious circle: the former is in need of the latter in order to assert itself as well as acquire strength and purpose. . ,' But the latter is not ready for this mission. It is not a coincidence that Jean Monnet once said that if he had started again, he would have done so with culture. Could a federated, even confederated Europe be given birth to by other than a `new' culture transcending the narrow bounds of the nation-state?

But what is European culture? It is such a complex, profound, and ambiguous subject that one cannot avoid trepidation in embarking upon an analysis of it. In this book I set forth my views on the Western vocation of Turkish culture. It may be of some interest if I reflect also on the core European culture as someone from a peripheral country with respect to this culture. This is all the more important in a world which is rapidly becoming westernized, in other words, putting all the eggs in the same basket, creating conditions conducive to a global civilizational catastrophe if things go wrong in the West.

I do not think that the present cooperation in the Community in the field of science and technology, education, communication, audio-visuals, computers and so forth can create a new European culture even in a modest way. Nor can a technocratic approach be feasible in this respect.

The cultural heritage of Europe based on the Graeco-Roman and Judeo-Christian foundations has been created through the Renaissance, the nation state, the Industrial Revolution, and parliamentary democracy. It is undoubtedly a tremendous asset. But the question remains as to how this heritage can be put to use with a view to creating a new Europe.

In reality it is extremely difficult to define the contours of this heritage, not to mention its precise content, even its that these efforts sometimes entailed `crimes and repudiations'.

I understand the attachment of Europeans to their age-old culture, to their freedom and energy released by it. I equally understand the anxiety before a cultural transformation which could diminish their energy for the sake of eliminating the possibility of internecine wars and racism while restoring harmony to their culture, inevitably on the basis of homeostasis. That might well entail a change of character, i.e. metamorphosis. Moreover, it might mean the end of history since freedom and creativity could also be dampened in this process.

The historical experiences of Turks, on the other hand, are largely derived from the universal states, i.e. the empires, which they founded. Consequently, equilibrium and harmony, or in other words homeostatic rather than dialectics, have been the prevailing characteristics of Turkish culture. They are aware of the dangers of inertia, and entropy inherent in it. In terms of culture, efforts to westernize or modernize Turkey boil down to introducing dialectics into their culture.

One has to recognize, however, that the dichotomous European culture has given birth to the nation-state which in turn heavily stressed this trait of the culture. Therefore, a culture that has created the `national subject' and saved humanity from its `guilty minority' (E. Kant) may realize that its genius could not go further ahead simply because it insists on operating within the old cultural parameters.

Sticking to the old (or present) cultural pattern, namely the dialectical and confrontational relationship between dichotomous schools of thought and art, political parties, ideologies, religions, sects, races, regions, nations, and civilizations deprives attempts to create a new Europe of any meaning. In the same vein, the mere addition of member countries together with whatever they have as national culture would not make up a 'new' Europe. This Europe could not escape the shortcomings, defects, and weaknesses of the nation state. On the contrary, it would embody these character deficiencies on a proportionately larger scale in line with is increased size. Dangers of war and racism, prevented perhaps within Europe, could be shifted beyond its frontiers, for remorse cannot live long. History, which has been seemingly created by freedom and energy, would in a sense come to an end due to the repetitiveness of the dialectical nature of the cultural process.

Could it therefore be that, at a time when a new Europe is coming into being politically, Europe ought to face the risk of losing its character, namely its culture?

Perhaps the question should be put in a more realistic framework. Is cultural change a matter of choice or necessity? In this respect one has to take into account some interrelated developments.

At present 'doctrinarians are obsolete, ideologists are undesirable, but work remains to be done by those who are on the way to creating a new discourse. . . Catholics and Huguenots, devouts and anti-clericals stopped fighting. . , splits between rationalism and ... "thinking from beyond" (irrational), between classical humanism and mathematical sciences, in sum between the scientific and literary cultures, are fading away'.

`The time has come to change the discourse of the method, the most difficult thing among all that should be done. Thinking does not mean any more confronting, or dividing into its constituent elements a totality which cannot be conceived of as an organization.' Thinking can only be systemic. `Hence dualism's lose ground to complex and entangled systems.'

This new methodology is also necessitated and supported by the absence of an external enemy as a result of the collapse of communism and the consequent redundancy of a policy operating exclusively on the concept of hostility and its related culture, provided that no new differences or dualism are artificially invented.

It should be kept in mind that the problems besetting humanity such as ecology, drug-addiction, delinquency, tension between social justice and economic efficiency and so forth call for responses geared to social, and eventually cultural harmony, albeit bearing in them the risk of inertia.

In this cultural transformation, the cultural output of Vienna at the turn of the century acquires an exceptional significance. Its protagonists were dejudaized Jews uprooted culturally and geographically. Europe, indeed the world, largely owes to them the latest advances in both mathematical and human sciences. Turkey has also benefited from their contribution thanks to those who escaped the persecution.

It is interesting to note that these Jews tried truly to universalize primarily human sciences. Their renouncing the Judaic tradition in order to get assimilated by European society made them the last victims of European ethnocentrism. Their contribution to human sciences still remains as rationalist statements to be appropriately put to use in culture.

Is it a mere coincidence that they have been rejected by Europe at a time when they became fully Europeanized or westernized? Relatively speaking one cannot help sensing a vague parallel between the treatment accorded to them and the way `westernized' Turks are currently reacted to by Europe. In both cases the `other' of Europe seemed about to melt away into the European culture which perceived this possibility as a serious threat to its being. Accordingly, it should not be a coincidence either that both peoples are of a monotheistic creed, basically outside dialectics, and close to the systemic thinking. In short, Europe dreaded losing its `other' in her dialectical relationship.

I agree, therefore, that `Europe which had spread too much over the land returned to itself and began to understand that there was nowhere else to go'. Only in this way could Europe realize that there is no difference between itself and the `other', that this `other' is one, perhaps, essential part of itself which consists of the negated elements of its culture. We now understand that unless this retreat into oneself, in other words withdrawal of its projections from 'others', is completely realized, Turkey stands little chance of being admitted as a full member of the Community.


The question remains, however, as to whether this cultural metamorphosis will deprive European culture of freedom and energy. I do not think so. For one thing, systems do not preclude interaction between and within their structures. Moreover, freedom and all that is inspired by it have become an essential part of the universal culture, not exclusive to Europe. Given the imperfect evolution of mankind, confrontational interaction cannot be overruled for good. But a new cultural harmony eliminating the need for a hostile `other' could release psychic energies for less pathological and dangerous creativity.ls2 To me this cardinal objective is the historic mission of the new Europe. Neither adding up, nor amalgamating, nor converging the national cultures of its members is sufficient in this respect. The successful way in which Europe will recode its culture programme in order to untangle this `Gordion knot' will render it truly and spontaneously universal once again.

Obviously, when we expressed our desire to participate in European integration in 1959, the views I've stated above had been only in a rudimentary stage.

In 1963 the Agreement of Ankara, which was similar to the agreement signed with Greece, gave us the provisional status of an Associate Member, the first step towards full membership. Our application under Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome, dated 14 April 1987, was made with the objective of accelerating the process of full membership.

Turkey believes that in joining the European Community she identifies her future with that of Europe. This is her fundamental purpose. At the cost of very great sacrifices Turkey has struggled for more than two centuries to establish a democratic way of life based on liberty and human rights. Since we share these ideals with Europe Turkey believes that she can defend them better with the help of Europe, which represents for her the geopolitical area on which this way of life and these values depend. Turkey is part of this area now, just as she always has been throughout her history.

History shows that war has been the normal relationship between states, and that the period between two wars is called `peace'. Surely the purpose of European integration is to put an end to this situation? Turks have made war against various European countries at times during the last thousand years. These wars have often been fought in the name of religion because religion used to have the strength of a political ideology. Wars began with the crusades in Anatolia, continued against the Habsburgs and the Romanovs in the Balkans, and were fought at sea with the Venetians. I see no reason to make excuses for this fact, but I do think that it is superficial to claim that these wars were all part of a great struggle between the Cross and the Crescent. We have learned from your history that reasons other than religion motivated the crusades. If they had been undertaken solely against the Crescent it would not have been necessary to make war against the Orthodox Christians, or to conquer, sack, and burn Constantinople. The Turks defended Anatolia, their new country, against the crusaders, refusing to be crushed by them in their fervour to reach the Holy Places.

The event which brought about the arrival of the Turks from the east and the Franks from the west was the disintegration of the Byzantine Empire and the political void which it created. The Catholics did not succeed in filling this void because they threatened not only the sovereignty of the Orthodox Christians but also their religion and their very identity. The Muslim Turks on the other hand, because of their synthesizing, ecumenical approach, were able to blend with the Greeks, recognized their religious freedom, and inherited from them the legacy of Byzantium.

The Byzantine territory inhabited by the Slavic Orthodox peoples also passed into the hands of the Ottomans as part of this legacy. Western Europe's struggle against the Ottomans in the name of Christianity may have been important for her own internal unity, and as a means of r regaining power, but her desire to snatch her long-standing enemy, the Orthodox Christians, from their Turkish ally struck no chord with the latter.

The French Revolution awakened a wave of nationalism and thereby accelerated the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The emergence of Slavic Orthodox Russia as a strong power was another factor. The Orthodox Christians then began a struggle for independence in the name of religion firstly and nationalism secondarily which continued until the end of the First World War. This use of religion as a justification for their action at a time when secularism, another product of the French Revolution, had become a dominant element of policy was something of a contradiction. Nevertheless, Turks discovered in the process of this struggle that their image had been durably tarnished as Anti-Christ.

Since the Ottomans shared the same geopolitical arena as the rest of Europe, they were inevitably drawn into the conflict and global wars of the other great European powers.

As the Ottomans were themselves a great power, between 1495 and 1690 they had prevented the Austria of the Habsburgs from extending its control over Europe. In the same way England put an end to Napoleonic rule, and the United States of America in its turn held the Germans in check. The Ottomans became part of the European concert in 1856 after they had temporarily stopped Russian expansion with the Crimean War (with the help of English and French armies). When they entered the First World War they did not anticipate that their own Empire would not be able to survive the ensuing massive upheaval in Europe.

The frontiers of the Republic which we then founded, together with the new regime, were recognized in 1923 at Lausanne by the whole of Europe. Although Turkey was aligned with the Allies during the Second World War, she was unable to participate effectively because her army was not adequately armed. She was thus spared having to be `saved' after the war. However, Stalin's post-war demands for territories and bases in Turkey caused her to see that she could not avoid being affected in one way or another by any European war, even if she remained virtually neutral.

This resume, brief though it is, shows that the Turks have for a thousand years been an important element in the balance of power in Europe. The new conditions created by the Second World War led Turkey to become a member of NATO in 1952. The defence of a free Europe was inconceivable without Turkey's participation. If we sometimes describe our position as `important' or `crucial' it is not from conceit. Our country is simply a peninsula which joins two continents, extending from east to west at the north-eastern end of the Mediterranean. It is Turkey's position as sovereign of the Straits and as neighbour of the Middle East which gives her such strategic importance.

We are equally aware of the many dangers inherent in our geopolitical situation. In order to be ready at all times to meet these dangers we are constantly faced with sacrifices. This is not something we boast about, nor do we claim either implicitly or explicitly that Europe should, for this single reason, grant us full membership. However, it remains true that our territory is of vital strategic importance to the defence of Europe and European interests.

If we had to consider only our own defence we should not necessarily be concerned with the defence of Europe. The commitment we have undertaken to defend Europe is for us a supplementary threat. The question to be answered is whether this threat can best be countered by Turkey being integrated into Europe or remaining outside. The Israel-Arab conflict, the oil crises, the revolution in Iran and the Gulf War which followed, as well as the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq all illustrate, even after the collapse of communism, the importance of a region in which Europe has vital interests and of which Turkey is a neighbour.

Turkey wishes to integrate with Europe because she forms part of the European theatre for defence and security. Since the European Community wishes to achieve not only economic integration but subsequently a political and defensive union, Turkey's request is not only legitimate, but logical and sensible. Nor is there a valid reason why our admission should be delayed until the Community has achieved economic integration and moves on to political integration. As with all other countries, at whatever stage she is admitted Turkey will have to adapt to the economy of the Community after becoming a member. The sooner it begins, the easier it will be.

Like the founding members of the European Community, we favour integration primarily in order to eliminate any possibility of a war between the constituent nation states. Turkey, like all European countries, has suffered enormously from wars. Greece is already part of the Community. Keeping Turkey outside it will not help to resolve bilateral problems with Greece. Greece cannot play an effective role in an integrated Community without Turkey, either economically or from the point of view of general security, situated as they both are a long way from the centre. Would it not be more intelligent for both peoples to reassess the four thousand years of common history of their lands in the light of present conditions and achieve the benefits that renewed solidarity within an integrated Europe would undoubtedly bring?

Let us examine the question of Turkey's membership of the Community from another angle. Although situated in the same geopolitical space as Europe, can she be considered to be within the boundaries of Europe? Geographically only a small part of Turkey is in Europe, all the rest is in Asia. That is why I asked at the beginning of this book if the Aegean Sea would separate for eternity not only two continents but two civilizations. In fact, the Agreement of Ankara has already answered `yes' to the question of whether Turkey can belong to the Community as a European country. At the time the Agreement was signed the idea that Turkey formed part of Europe was accepted quite naturally. However, since 1980 certain especially influential factions in European public opinion and in the European Parliament have started to raise doubts about Turkey's European status, even though the last quarter of a century has made us even more European. Has Europe's view on integration changed, or do the difficulties appear more clearly as dates draw closer which in 1960 seemed still to be a long way in the future? We are puzzled by the fact that objections seem to be increasing instead of diminishing since Turkey's return to democracy.

European integration is not a cooperation between governments but a movement towards union between individuals and peoples. Can the Turk and the Turkish people take their rightful place in this integration, or must they just be tolerated for purely strategic reasons? Will Turkey's membership change not only the territorial frontiers but also the cultural frontiers of Europe? Certainly, in the same way that every frontier region is different from the central regions, so the heart of every culture differs from its periphery. But surely in Turkey's case it is more a difference of character than of degree or nuance? To put these questions clearly and to try to find answers is just as important for you as it is for us. I hope that in this book I have been able to explain my views on this subject with sufficient clarity.

I am not a historian. But the book I have in the end written is of a historical nature, though different from the version to which you may be accustomed.l54 All history is choice: choice of subject, choice of facts. For myself I have chosen the facts that you might not choose, for reasons which distance themselves from your value judgments, your philosophy, and your points of view. By so doing I hope that I may have revealed for you another perspective on our history which, until now, may have been hidden.

Above all, I do not claim that what I have written is the only truth. However, I can say with confidence that it is one aspect of the truth, and one which has been neglected. Nor do I ask you to repudiate your own history. I only suggest that you read mine - this one - as well as your own.

I am not convinced that one can reach the truth even by studying two versions of an event; they cannot add up in an arithmetical way. It requires a great effort of understanding to arrive at the truth about any situation. However, to be aware of two points of view on a historical event is a considerable step towards the truth. This step would have to be taken, it seems to me, even if Turkey had not submitted a request for membership of the European Community.

Allow me now to summarize my conclusions.

The Turks, living in this territory for a thousand years, have inherited some part of the culture of every civilization which flourished here since prehistory. They have evolved a synthesis derived from the cultural legacy of Anatolia, from the culture they brought with them from Central Asia, and from the Muslim religion. Their talent for synthesis and their ecumenical character have enabled them to blend these three strands together. The imprint of these heritage's is readily visible in the cultural fabric of Turkey today. You yourselves accept that your own civilization originated in Mesopotamia (where civilization flowered for the first time), then Anatolia, the Aegean basin, and Rome. We have at least as much right as you to adopt these ancient civilizations as our own, since they are those of our own land. In looking at our history as an insider of Anatolia, we can claim to have lived on this land since the beginning of the Anatolian civilizations, for both culturally and demographically the preceding civilization has each time been carried over, at least to a certain extent, into the succeeding one.

It was we, therefore, who brought about the Neolithic revolution. The Sumerians were also a people whose language was agglutinative like ours and had the most important word, namely God, in common with us. The Anatolian civilizations were created by indigenous peoples, Hattis, Hurrians, Lydians, Lycians, Sea Peoples, and Minoan Cretans. Indo-European peoples such as the Hittites, the Luvians, and later the Ionians and the Phrygians, were assimilated by the indigenous peoples, who had been already civilized.

The Hittites succeeded in establishing an empire which was the first Anatolian political union. It had the same geopolitical core as the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires, and suffered the same fate.

At Troy it was we Anatolians who resisted the foreign aggressor, with 'the help of the Anatolian gods' and of men gathered from all corners of Anatolia, who did not even speak the same language. Later we defended ourselves against the crusaders, then in 1915 against the Allies invading the Dardanelles.

Homer - our countryman - in the ninth century BC signalled the beginning of what would later be called `the Greek miracle' in Anatolia. This `miracle', which was created in the first place by Anatolian `physicists', crossed the Aegean Sea to mainland Greece. Science and knowledge of the cosmos developed on our shore of the Aegean; ethos, philosophy, and theatre on the other shore. Both shores gave rise to cities which nurtured political and economic liberties.

The appearance of the Greek miracle in Anatolia following Crete, which was the cultural extension of Anatolia, was predictable since civilization had been born in the East and moved to the West. The Greek Revolution in 1820 prompted European historians to regard mainland Greece as the starting point of their civilization, overlooking the cradle of the miracle. They did so because the source was Anatolia, our country inhabited by Turks.

After the Greek miracle Anatolia was occupied by the Persians coming from one side and the Macedonians coming from the other. Eventually they brought nothing but ruin and caused Anatolian science to lie dormant until the Renaissance. The remnants of this cultural heritage can be found today in Anatolian folklore, myths, fables, dances, clothes, houses, carpets, cooking, music, and common words. In this sense no one in western Europe can claim to be as Aegean as ourselves. To accept this fact, however, means that one first has to give up an ethnocentric perspective of history.

Later came the Roman Empire. Anatolia was its most important province, and her culture and civilization revived accordingly. She became aware of belonging to the whole Mediterranean basin. Christianity, which was just beginning at this time, received its name at Antioch, and by the efforts of Paul of Tarsus-another of our countrymen -was spread throughout Anatolia where the first seven churches were built. The apostle John lived at Ephesus and his Gospel begins with a reference to the logos, a concept of Heraclitus. The pioneers of the new monotheistic religion encountered the superior rational culture of pagans for the first time in Anatolia. The classical culture was swept away by Christian humanism but only after Christianity had absorbed the ideas of the Greek philosophers Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, as well as the folk culture.

With the advent of the Eastern Roman Empire, monotheism became the State religion, and Anatolian political unity was restored. This Empire had to struggle against the Sassanids to the east, the Muslim Arabs to the south, and the barbarians to the west. The Balkans became converted to Orthodoxy. The Christian religion, which had been born here, underwent an internal evolution. With time it became differentiated from Catholicism whose evolution unfolded in a different social, political, and cultural context.

The system of pronoia (fief-timar), an original creation of the Eastern Roman Empire, eventually degenerated, resulting in the ruin of its agriculture. The Capitulations weakened its economy and bubonic plague decimated its population. In the end the Empire was surviving only through the efforts of its shrewd diplomacy. Everything changed in 1071 with the arrival of the Seljuk Turks, followed by the Franks in the role of crusaders. Both of these groups wanted to fill the void left by the decline of Byzantium.

Ostensibly the aim of the Franks was to liberate the Holy Places and Byzantium from the Muslim Turks. Indeed, they captured the Holy Places but held them only for a short time, and soon showed scant sympathy towards the Orthodox Christians. In 1204 the fourth crusade captured Constantinople. Throughout this period of two hundred years the Turks had gradually been settling in Anatolia. The Anatolian peoples and the Muslim Turks, by living together on the same land during this time, gradually achieved a new cultural synthesis. A large contribution to this process was made by the Turkish mystics, Mevlânâ and Yunus-our countrymen.

Turkish philosophers had preceded Turkish warriors in the Middle East by two centuries, and the conquest of Constantinople by five centuries. AI-Fârâbî, the first of these philosophers, was an Aristotelian. Both he and, later, Avicenna attempted to create a synthesis between Greek rationalism and Koranic dogma. Their method was dialectic, teaching as they walked with their students.

Other Muslim philosophers included not only celebrated Platonists and Aristotelians but also natural scientists, influenced by the Anatolian Physicists. Muslim mystics were also influenced by Neoplatonism.

The works of all these philosophers, who kept Greek philosophy alive and enabled it to develop, were translated into Latin and, through Spain and Sicily, reached the rest of western Europe, where they contributed much to the Renaissance. Had Europe been fair, it should have added the word Islam to the equation which represented its cultural background to make it 'Judeo-Christian-Islamic, Graeco-Roman'.

Islam, like the two other monotheistic religions, bears witness to Abraham. In spite of their universal nature all three were revealed to the Semites and, though different, have points in common. The Turks, just as much as the Indo-Europeans, were foreigners to the Semites. Islam, like Judaism and Christianity, was eastern Mediterranean in origin.

That is why, when the Ottomans prevailed, the Byzantine philosophers were convinced that the members of the two creeds could be reconciled. The hostility shown by the crusaders towards the Orthodox Church merely facilitated the transmission of the Byzantine legacy to the Ottomans. The Ottomans subsequently inherited many Byzantine institutions, either directly or through intermediaries such as the Sassanids-Samanids, Omayyads and Abbasids, Grand-Seljuks, and Anatolian Seljuks.

If the Roman Empire represented the extent of the spread of Western culture, it also played a no less important part in the structure of the Ottoman Empire. In addition to the contribution of the Greeks, whether converted to Islam or not, the Ottomans received from the East Roman Empire the entire Balkan heritage, including Greece herself.

By 1517 the Ottoman Empire included all the European territories which had previously been Byzantine, except for the south of Italy. The Patriarchate, newly endowed with political powers and uniting previously separate Churches, became more powerful than it had ever been in the time of Byzantium.

The zenith was reached at the end of the sixteenth century when the decline of the Empire began. Factors which contributed to the downward trend were the growth of maritime trade by European countries following voyages of exploration, the Capitulations, inflation, deterioration of the ecosystem, the collapse of fundamental institutions such as the fief and the corps of Janissaries, and the prohibitive cost of defending an oversized Empire.

In an attempt to regain the grandeur of the time of Suleyman the Magnificent, the first reforms in the seventeenth century proposed a restoration of the previous conditions by strengthening the central authority. Westernization reforms began only after the defeat by the Russians in 1774, ratified by the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca.

The real basic cause of the decline of the Ottoman Empire was the fact that western Europe managed to push forward its own evolution-by means of the Renaissance, the Reformation, the French Revolution, liberalism, and the industrial revolution-to the stage of the nation-State, a development process different from and more successful than that pursued by the Ottoman Empire. Like Byzantium, the Ottomans never experienced a Renaissance period, for both remained loyal to the mission and the nature of the universal state.

The initial power of the Empire was itself the cause of delay in launching westernizing reforms. When they eventually came they began with the army. The judicial system was then modernized by gradually withdrawing the administration of justice and education from the control of the religious authorities. Then ideas of homeland and liberty made their appearance, and an attempt was made to limit the power of the Sultan. However, the reforms were not carried through due to the rebellions of Christian communities in the Balkans, inspired by nationalism and stirred up by Russia, and the wars which followed.

The Capitulations evolved into a means of colonization. The Empire found itself in debt and could not repay what it had borrowed. When bankruptcy came, its revenues were confiscated. Except for a short period, successive governments did not pay enough attention to the economy.

After the loss of the Balkans, Islamism and Westernism competed to give the Empire a new identity. The pro-Western faction won the day. Our War of Independence following the end of the First World War, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, resulted in the foundation of our nation-state, the final victory of secularism, and the breaking of ties with the Islamic and Ottoman past.

Despite Atatürk's liberal approach, after the crisis of 1929 governments attempted to develop the country under State control. At the end of the Second World War there was a move in favour of economic liberalism, but the fear left by the Capitulations was such that it was impossible to adopt a truly liberal economic policy, and the Ottoman tradition of economic interventionism continued.

Distrust of the provinces tended to reinforce centralization. The habit of seeing the businessman as the non-Muslim merchant of the Empire who had collaborated with the foreigner prevented the development of the private sector. By the middle of the nineteen-seventies a planned economy based on import-substituting industrialization has been in place. The world economic crisis triggered by two oil shocks made the failure of this policy inevitable.

The reforms implemented by those in power, both at the time of the Ottomans and after the proclamation of the Republic, had the effect of producing a certain polarization between the various factions and political parties. This became more apparent during the democratic regime. Despite advocating basically similar economic policies, the two principal parties became engaged in a rivalry so violent that it ultimately led the young people to throw themselves into an armed struggle. With the subversive activities of external forces, the economic crisis turned itself into a political crisis in which the authority of the State was negated by terrorism. It was in these circumstances that the military intervention of 1980 took place.

Since then, and particularly since 1983, we have radically changed our economic policy. We have liberalized foreign trade and exchange regimes, and abolished price controls. We have invested State revenues exclusively in developing a national infrastructure. We have facilitated the activities of entrepreneurs and the private sector. We have begun a policy of privatization, encouraged foreign capital to invest in our country, and increased savings by improving the return that they yield. We have given preferential support to exports by maintaining realistic exchange rates.

Thus the energies which for centuries had been repressed are now released, enabling Turkish businessmen and engineers to establish themselves in the outside world. Economic stability is assured by the operation of market forces. The healthy growth of our economy is demonstrated by the rapid increase in exports. This has allowed us at last to overcome the balance of payments deficit which had existed ever since the Ottoman era. We have also accelerated urban development by the transfer to local authorities of large and regular financial resources.

Westernization reforms have thus been fully implemented. As a country which developed relatively late, what should have been done at the beginning, namely liberal economic reforms, could only be realized at the end of the process. Westernization reforms in general, and economic reforms in particular, have provided us with the rationalist culture that escaped us at the time of the Renaissance. By westernizing, our country has become modern, and by modernizing it has become westernized. Attaining the same economic level as Europe is now only a matter of time, and perhaps only a short time.

During the decline of the Ottoman Empire the Western image of the Turk deteriorated badly. The Turk, who had been feared and respected during the sixteenth century, became despised in defeat. By degrees the West came to regard the Ottoman as ignorant and barbaric, and began to direct its policy towards the `liberation' of `oppressed' Christians. In fact, there has never been a shortage of reasons to attack a country in decline. Religion merely served as a camouflage for the true reason which was basically political. Moreover, as a result of the new currents created by the French Revolution, Christians had begun to want their national independence. Multinational states were passing into history.

It is clear that wars between western Europe and the Turks gave rise to a particular view of us. But has not the West made war upon itself, especially in the name of religion, more often than we have? Leaving aside the eight million and twelve million men who met their death on the battlefields of the First and Second World Wars respectively, let us remember that the Thirty Years War cost two million lives and the Napoleonic Wars two and a half million. The number of victims of a thousand years of Turco-European conflicts is in no way comparable with these figures.

Why then is our image in the West so bad? I believe that the answer to this question is to be found in the West itself.

The development of western Europe after the Renaissance soon made it profoundly different from Ottoman society. Montesquieu used this difference as an instrument on behalf of the evolution of French society. According to him, it was clear that France must follow a path opposite to that of Ottoman despotism. The economic and political forces for change in France defined the kind of State and society they wanted as the antithesis, the negation, the inverse of the Ottoman model. They represented the Turk as being what they must not be, and choosing him as their `negative identity'. Ethnocentrism grew in western Europe, notably during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as a result of progress and the growth in material power. Together with it there developed an intellectual movement away from religion and faith. The resultant self-idolization increased the need for, and reinforced the negative identity attached to the Ottomans. Historical studies based on race and language also made their contribution. The Westerner took for granted that all good and positive values were the product of his own society, whereas the Turks possessed all the undesirable and negative qualities. This Manichean attitude gathered additional strength each time there was a crisis in Europe, sometimes directed against the Turks, sometimes against other ethnic groups.

The reforms undertaken by the Turks for their survival were interpreted as being efforts to correct faults in themselves which they had finally recognized. The crisis of identity suffered by the Turks at the end of the Empire and under the Republic, and the fact that certain occidentalists perceived Western society as the ideal model to imitate, confirmed the division of roles: on the one hand the Turks were struggling to be accepted by the West; on the other the Europeans, refusing to be satisfied by any effort towards westernization whatsoever, were convinced that the Turk could never become a Westerner, and criticized him unceasingly in order to prove it.

After the intervention of the army in 1980 Turkey's image has further deteriorated. The socio-political segments with left leanings, whose historic mission seemed to come to an end in the West, raised the banner against Turkey on the grounds of violations of human rights in general and ethnic rights in particular. It is far from me to defend the military regime. But I cannot help noting that at more or less the same time some people in the member-states of the Community were conceiving the process of integration as concomitant with the disintegration of their societies into regional and ethnic 'fundamentals' which they sometimes qualified as 'retribalization'. As a reaction to this development, ultra-right parties and movements sprouted, soon directing their racial hatred at guest workers. The atavistic feelings thus aroused in Europe were not admitted by the majority, but were instead projected on to the Turks. Those Europeans who failed to love their next-door neighbour of different race started defending the human rights of those who were too far away to be visualized, while supporting the so-called oppressed ethics in or out of their country in a redemptive effort.

It is our sincere desire that this false image of us should be put right. It neither corresponds with reality, nor does it reflect the truth. To build relationships between western Europe and ourselves on such a foundation could only be the source of dangerous instability. If one thinks back to the terrible events prior to and during the Second World War, one would expect from Europe a little more self-criticism.

Despite the injustices inflicted on us during our long history, Turkey's full membership of the European Community would not cause any major difficulties for us. The reforms in Turkey secularized not only relations between the State and religion but also our manner of viewing history and life. Great sufferings matured us. The role previously played by religion in political and social life was reduced by the adoption of secularism, with religion becoming internalized within individuals in the form of increased faith. Helped by the moderate nationalism of Atatürk, this put an end to our crisis of identity. Secularism has given us an intellectual and moral steadfastness which is capable of welcoming all culture and all technology without threat to our identity.

Our full membership of the Community should not cause any particular difficulties for you either. Our country, its culture, its religion, its institutions, its regime, and its economy are all now sufficiently comparable with your own. Moreover, Turkey is physically part of the geopolitical area of the West. As Edgar Morin commented, Europe is a continent without fixed borders which have been changing constantly during the course of history.

According to him, Europe is:

............ a complex whose attribute is to bring together the greatest diversities without confusion, and to associate opposites in a non-separable manner... there is nothing that was hers from the beginning, and nothing which is exclusively hers today.. That which underlies the unity of European culture is not the Judeo-Christian-Graeco-Roman synthesis, but the not only complementary but also competitive and antagonistic interplay between these separate traditions, each of which has its own logic.

When integrating itself with a greater whole each country brings with it its experience of life. If, for a man, the best and worst moments of his life constitute the value of his experience, perhaps the same is true for nations. No country has ever experienced such magnificence and glory, nor such trials and suffering, as we have.

To embrace Turkey, Europe's view of her own history and perception of the world will need to be as secular and universal as ours is. The Europe capable of accepting Turkey as a full member of the Community will have risen above ethnocentrism. No longer needing to project her own negative aspects to other countries, she will be at peace with herself, will renounce all Manicheism, and, encompassing within herself both good and bad, will arrive at a global vision appropriate to her enlarged geographic borders. She will understand how illogical it is for a Europe not to include Anatolia, the cradle of civilization in the northern Mediterranean. She will recognize the Aegean Sea as a stretch of water which unites the two coasts on which appeared one of the greatest civilizations of the world.

Today Turkey is the first country with a Muslim population which has established a republican regime, created a nation-state, founded a secular society, become truly democratic, and is industrializing rapidly.

I am confident that, unless it diverts from the course on which it has set out, Turkey will soon become a fully developed country with the creativity generated by its cultural heritage duly preserved and reinvigorated in line with the requirements of our time. Thanks to its geopolitical location this development will not fail to have an impact on the Middle-East, the Balkans, Central Asia, and eastern Europe.

Turkey has knocked at the door of the EC, fully aware that both the Community and Turkey can survive without our full membership. However, the significance of the answer will be no less profound.