Selected Books
Turkey in Europe & Europe in Turkey
Turgut Özal

The Westernizing Reforms

"The hardest thing in life is to know which bridge to cross and which to burn."
David Russel

The reforms introduced during the nineteenth century, which might be called the longest century in the history of the Ottoman Empire, and those which were brought about after the establishment of the Republic, still remain subjects of discussion in Turkey today.

As would be expected, the present Turkish political movements hold somewhat differing opinions on these reforms. Nevertheless, everyone living in Turkey today is in some way a product of the reforms. Although our degree of adoption and our reactions vary according to our individual views, no one can claim to have escaped their influence.

I want to emphasize that, even though their ideas differed, the reformers had one and the same purpose: to safeguard the Ottoman Empire and the Turks. Nevertheless, their opponents were no less patriotic than themselves. The tragedy with a declining empire is that the actors, be they reformers or conservatives, become tragic actors, namely adversaries confronting each other in mortal combat for the same cause.

The First Reforming Sultans

If one disregards the few attempts of his predecessors, the first Sultan determined to implement reforms along Western lines was Selim III (1789-1807).

He took advantage of the disorder created in Europe by the French revolution to introduce changes. He had previously corresponded with Louis XVI about military reforms. After the revolution-except for a short interruption due to Napoleon's campaign in Egypt - France continued to play a fundamental part in the reform movement. It was at that time that the first permanent embassies were established in Europe (Vienna, Paris, London, and Berlin). The diplomats appointed to these posts subsequently made an important contribution to the reform movement.

However, Selim's principal concern was to establish a new army in place of the Janissaries, whose very existence was a threat to the Empire. He tackled this task with the aid of French advisers. Although respect for France and the desire to cooperate with her had increased as a result of her many victories, this very cooperation, coupled with the uneasiness of the Janissaries with regard to the new army (Nizam-y Cedid), resulted in violent opposition when Selim proposed a general recruiting campaign. He withdrew the proposal at the last minute, but in vain. He was dethroned, and assassinated shortly afterwards.

It is fitting. . . to praise the memory of Selim, martyred for his belief in the destiny of his country, a man whose worst fault was that his courage outran his prudence.'

In another direction, the local dignitaries of Anatolia and Rumelia had been successful in persuading Selim to sign a document recognizing their authority at a local level. Thus a legal limitation had been placed on the Sultan's authority outside the capital.

The reign of Selim III was important because it marked the real beginning of the westernizing reforms. The young officers trained with the help of France formed a second social group to have been exposed to contact with Westerners. They had learned a Western language and become familiar with at least one aspect of the West. Like the diplomats, this group was destined to play an important role in future reforms.

The second of the reforming Sultans, and perhaps the greatest, was Mahmut II (1808-39). He learned from the experience of Selim III, realizing that anyone wanting to westernize must build on the Ottoman and Muslim past. He therefore never made reference to `change' but set about concentrating power into his own hands. He understood that it was necessary to do away with all institutions which did not adequately fulfill their function of controlling and stabilizing society, and which served only to impede reforms.

In 1826 he put down the revolt of the Janissaries against the new army he had established: this is known in Ottoman history as Vak'a-i hayriye, `The Auspicious Incident'. He then put an end to the system of fiefs, thereby reestablishing central authority in the provinces. Finally he confiscated the property of the religious foundations, out of whose revenues the Ulema were paid. The Muftis, who under their own leader had until 1826 constituted an autonomous institution with judicial powers, then became merely government functionaries.

Thus institutions unique to the Ottomans, which for better or worse had limited the Sultan's will, ceased to exist. As an autocrat, Mahmut could be likened to, say, Peter the Great (known in Turkish history as Peter the Fool), but there was one essential difference between them: the Sultan knew nothing of the West.

Having destroyed the Ottoman political structure, he was able to impose his reforms. The staffs of Ottoman embassies in Europe were increased. He organized the new army, not with the help of France, which was then supporting the insurgents of Morea, and Mehmet Ali Pasha in Egypt, but he instead collaborated closely with the Prussian Marshal von Moltke. He did not need to establish military schools; they existed already.

As the university of Süleymaniye was still teaching the medicine of Galen and Avicenna, Mahmut founded a new school to teach modern medicine. Primary education was made compulsory. One hundred and fifty students were sent to Europe. A postal service was established, and the foundations of a nationwide police system were laid. He ended the penalty of confiscation, which had been the source of much mistrust of the Ottoman bureaucracy. The first newspapers appeared during his reign. He reorganized the hierarchy of government along European lines, creating certain new ministries. Those of Education and Justice were made responsible for the appointment of teachers and judges, which had previously been done by the Mufti. The domination exercised by religion over teaching and justice thus began to be curtailed.

Mahmut replaced the various types of male head-dress by the fez. This apparently trifling innovation (the other examples of which we shall see later in the reform package of Atatürk) is of great importance: it was a manifestation of the Sultan's desire that his subjects of various faiths should no longer be distinguishable by their attire. Mahmud is reported to have said: `Henceforth I recognize Muslims only in the mosque, Christians only in the church, Jews only in the synagogue. Outside these places of worship I desire every individual to enjoy the same political rights. . .'

The Diplomat Pashas and the `Tanzimat'

After these first two reforming Sultans, the diplomat Pashas came on the scene. Trained in the recently opened embassies, they were reformers who had themselves lived in the West and spoke its languages, and had had the opportunity to observe and reflect.

Having become Ministers of Foreign Affairs or Prime Ministers, they accelerated the reform movement. It was their opinion that to obtain the respect of the West, the Ottoman Empire not only needed a strong army but had to be seen as a `civilized society'. The ideas and examples of the great Western countries of that time thus became even more influential on the reforms.

Aware that, in matters of Ottoman reform, Westerners concerned themselves particularly with Christian minorities, the Pashas accordingly paid them more attention. They were under serious pressure to do so anyway. Consequently, whereas in the preceding period priority had been given to reforming the army, the reforms of the Pashas were above all of a judicial nature.

On 3 November 1839 Mustafa Re?id Pasha, who had served as Ottoman Ambassador in Paris and was anxious to save his country from the fate that had overtaken the French monarchy, made public the Noble Decree of the Rose Chamber, the first great document of reorganization to be enacted in Turkish history. It was a charter whereby the Sultan abdicated a portion of his authority in favour of the Council of Judicial Ordinances which was henceforth to have the power to make laws, subject to the Sultan's approval. It guaranteed to the Sultan's subjects the security of their lives, their honour, and their goods, an equal length of military service for all, open and equitable legal processes, and equality of persons whatever their religion.

A new penal code was adopted in 1840. It represented the first step towards the abandonment of the Muslim legal code, or Shari'a, a term meaning divine law which could not be modified by man and which extended to all aspects of life. By a very old tradition, the Sultans had always been able to issue secular laws. These were enacted under the name of kanun when it was a question of new dispositions or detailed regulations. Nevertheless, the following year there were protests when, in the course of discussing the draft commercial law, Re?id Pasha stated in reply to a question from a member of the Ulema that this law had nothing to do with the Shari'a. Mustafa Re?id Pasha was relieved of his duties by the new Sultan, Abdülmecid. The adoption of this commercial law in 1850 constituted the first renunciation of the Shari'a.

The economy was not a priority for the reorganizing Pashas any more than it had been for the reforming Sultans. Although Re?id Pasha did concern himself with financial questions, seeking to create stable money and support for the Treasury, he was not successful in holding down inflation.

In 1840 the Ottoman Bank was established and the first paper money printed. This consisted mostly of Treasury Bonds, easy to imitate and the exact number of which was not known! In addition, the events of the Crimean War had seriously compromised financial stability. External credit underwritten in 1858 in order to redeem the bonds was the first of a long series of debts, which resulted in 1875 in the collapse of the financial system and an enormous deficit.

After Re?id Pasha, the reforms were undertaken by ex-diplomats Ali and Fuad Pashas. Their aim was for Turkey to take her rightful place in the European scene. In 1856 an imperial edict assured equality in taxation and in certain other levies where previously there had been discrimination between Christians and Muslims. The system of farming out tax collection was ended.

Within the framework of judicial reforms, a new law of land ownership was adopted, also in 1856. It was believed that resolving the problems of landed property would automatically ensure the development of rural regions, as had happened in Europe. The new law defined land-owning rights, taking into account both Ottoman tradition and Western judicial concepts. Several of the countries which seceded have retained this law.

The accession of Abdulaziz to the throne in 1861 was marked by increasingly strong reaction against the reforms, which by then had been in progress for ninety years. Despite this, reform of the prefectures system was undertaken in 1864.

Also during his reign, the Galatasaray School was established in 1868. This was a significant secondary institution which taught in French, and which was to play an important role in the education of the Ottoman élite. Some years earlier, Robert College had been founded by American Protestants.

Finally, a new civil code was adopted. Ali Pasha wanted to adopt the French civil code, but it was the Mecelle which prevailed. This masterpiece of Ottoman law was based on the Shari'a. The Mecelle still forms the basis of the judicial systems of several Muslim countries which came into being in the Middle East after the disappearance of the Ottoman Empire.

The defeat of France by Prussia in 1871 put an end to the reforms of the diplomat Pashas which had been inspired mainly by France. Reaction manifested itself in affirming the Islamic character of the Empire to the detriment of westernization. It was the first sign of the Pan-Islamist movement which was about to arise. It reminded the Muslim communities in those African and Asian countries which had been colonized by Europe that 'the Ottoman Sultan was also the Caliph of the Muslims'.

Let us pause here to make an assessment of the Ottoman attempts at reform. The first reforms were introduced by the Sultans with the primary objective of replacing degenerate institutions. Priority was given to the army, on which the survival of the Empire depended.

The diplomat Pashas who followed drew their inspiration from the positivism of Augusta Comte, and concentrated on improving the judicial system and consolidating the central administration.

It was assumed that when individual rights were guaranteed, and equality between persons assured, progress would automatically follow.

There were indeed some important advances, notably in the field of education. However, it could not be said that the reforms had, on the whole, achieved their aim, but only that the Empire of 1870 was very different from that of 1770, and that the Janissary army had been abolished and the power of the Ulema had been reduced by several assaults on the Shari'a.

Europe, however, remained unsatisfied. Independence movements multiplied among the Christian communities with the support, both overt and covert, of Tsarist Russia and other Western powers.

The independence of Morea had awakened in Europe a romantic nostalgia for Greek civilization. The Ottoman reforms were not taken seriously because Europe did not believe in the sincerity of the reformers. It was thought that the reforms were undertaken principally as an attempt to regain political prestige.

Thus, the more the Ottoman Empire tried to become like Europe, the more Europe resisted. Having endowed the Ottomans a century before with a `negative identity', Europe could not accept that this Empire could ever become like herself. It is doubtful whether Europe really wanted it to happen.

Europe adopted this same attitude in 1980, retaining it even after 1983 which marked our return to democracy. The more we advance towards full democracy, the more the West in general, and the European Parliament in particular, appears to be on its guard; a reaction difficult to understand unless viewed historically.

This situation gave rise among the Ottoman intelligentsia to additional doubts about the reforms, regardless of whether they supported or were opposed to them. Even so, by the time 1871 arrived, the old order had been abolished to the extent that it was no longer possible to restore it. Such a precedent invalidates the arguments of those who, today, believe that Turkey could even now renounce its secular stance.

Reformer Poets

From the 1860s onwards, the reforms had a great influence on writers, particularly poets.

?inasi, Ziya Pasha, and Namik Kemal were among the reformer poets. They opposed the 'Pashas of the Tanzimat', accusing them of merely copying Western ideas. The Tanzimat upheld the supremacy of the law, but who could guarantee the application of this law against the usurpations of the Sultan after the Ottoman institutions which had limited his power and held him in check had disappeared?

Drawing inspiration from the French revolution, these poets extolled liberty above all else. Looking back to pre-Ottoman history and the origins of Islam, they pointed to institutions which permitted those in opposition to make themselves heard and to take action. The poets began to seek reforms with an Islamic precedent, since in their view reform ought not to lead to a denial of our Islamic past. It was sufficient to import from Europe the latest industrial, agricultural, and commercial technologies and know-how. Faith and the heritage of Islam should be kept after having been re-evaluated and compared to the new Western values.

Hence the question was no longer whether to accept or reject `Western' reforms; it was how to limit the autocratic power of the State, and place the reforms in an Islamic context. One can see that they were indeed poets and not politicians.

Following the European fashion of the time, they were called the `Young Ottomans'. Instead of the arbitrary will of the Sultan, they proposed a constitutional government, which openly raised the question of the political rights of the citizen. They were trying to associate this idea, of Anglo-French origin, with the law of Islam. This initiative recalls the early Islamic philosophers who tried to reconcile the rationalism of Aristotle with religious faith.

Along with the concept of liberty appeared the idea of the fatherland (Turks prefer the term 'motherland'). In an empire in the process of dissolution, this idea assumed great emotional significance. According to the Young Ottomans, in order to be able to defend the fatherland it was essential for liberty to reign in it. In other words, it was necessary to put an end to the despotism of the Sultan.

I draw attention here to the fact that in the West liberty appeared as a function of the political rights of the nation and the individual. In the Ottoman Empire, however, the concept of `nation' did not exist in the Western sense at that time. The concept of liberty arose therefore at the same time as that of fatherland. In Europe the concept of fatherland appeared only at an advanced stage of nationalism, in the form of patriotism.

The Young Ottomans were sometimes fugitives, sometimes exiles, sometimes appointed to junior posts in government. When they withdrew from the political scene, they constituted the first serious liberal opposition, a phase preparatory to the establishment of a constitutional monarchy.

Contrary to what one might have believed, there was something revolutionary in the fatherland concept, since the absolute loyalty to the Sultan was split by allegiance towards an abstract concept previously unknown: the fatherland. This explains the strong reaction of the Sultan to this concept, though a bizarre attitude it might seem at first sight.

PREVIOUS PAGE                                                                                  NEXT PAGE