The Eastern Roman Empire
"Alas! O unhappy and long suffering race of mortals! From what conflicts, from
what Iamentations you are born."
Empedocles of Agrigentum.
Constantine became Emperor in 306, after a period of considerable upheaval. He adopted
Christianity in 312, and in 330 established at Byzantium the city which would carry his
name, Constantinople.
Constantine was born at Naissus, a town situated not far from Byzantium. He first
considered using Troy or Nicomedia as his capital, but, for reasons still obscure to this
day, his final choice fell upon the large village situated between the Bosphorus and the
Golden Horn. After very rapid development (its population soon reached five hundred
thousand people), Constantinople merited the title of `the New Rome'.
Having become sole Emperor, Constantine rendered the title hereditary, in an endeavour to
spare his people the crises which would erupt at each succession. He created a new
coinage, the solidus, and introduced various measures to encourage farmers,
merchants, and artisans. He reformed the civil administration by separating the military
and political powers. He thus gave the Empire a longheaded period of stability.
Although he did not make Christianity the State religion but merely one of the religions
tolerated by the State, it is true to say that he `Christianized' the legal system.
It was during the reign of Theodosius I in 391 that a decree made Christianity the
official State religion, thus opening the era of religious empires which would continue
with the Germanic Holy Roman Empire, established by Charlemagne in 800, and the Ottoman
Empire created in 1299.
Though they had aspects in common, the two religious empires presented important
differences. Whereas in the Eastern Roman Empire only one religion was officially
recognised and others discouraged, among the Ottomans a special regime (the system of
`nations') not only protected the rights of the faithful of other religions, but also
tolerated a variety of Islamic sects and orders.
In 395 Theodosius divided the Empire between his two sons, from which date there were
two Roman Empires. Both had to repel repeated invasions coming from the north and the
east, but the Eastern Roman Empire succeeded better in this struggle than the Western
Empire.
There were various reasons for this. Firstly, Anatolia was much more densely populated,
was to a large extent urbanised, and had become affluent through long established industry
and commerce. Constantine's reforms, although they had not been applied in their totality,
had accelerated economic development. In the sixth century the East was much more skilled
than the West in employing tools and other techniques in agriculture, the fundamental
sector of economic growth. The West did not attain a comparable level until the tenth
century.
Secondly, in addition to demographic and economic superiority, the East also enjoyed a
more effective sociopolitical structure. In the West, a very powerful class of senators
came between the Emperor and the people, and also between the workers and the sources of
production. This class had accumulated into its hands all the natural resources. It had
also gained control of the labour force, which it guarded against the demands of the
Emperor for soldiers. It had no intention of sharing its wealth.
In the East, the Emperor had free access to men and money. During the seventh century
Emperor Heraclius introduced the division of the Empire into provinces or `themes', the
administration of which he entrusted to the commanders-in-chief of the armies. Conquered
lands were distributed to the soldiers in perpetuity, in exchange for the hereditary
obligation of military service. A class of peasant-soldiers or officer-proprietors was
thus established.
In peacetime they cultivated their land; in wartime they served in the army with their
men. The cultivator of the land and its defender were one and the same. Later the system
was extended to the inhabitants of Anatolia and, under the reign of the Ottomans, it
became the basis of the land-owning system. It was not until the period of the decline of
the Eastern Roman Empire that the feudal lords, having become powerful, began to exploit
the workers and other resources for their own profit. This same phenomenon occurred again
during the decline of the Ottoman Empire.
Thirdly, the Black Sea to the north of Anatolia was an effective front line of defence
for the centre of gravity of the Empire against attacks from the north, whereas Italy is
dominated by the Alps.
For this reason, a little-known Germanic tribe, the Herules, was able to invade Italy
in 476 and occupy Rome, unconquered for the previous eight centuries. It was the end of
the Western Roman Empire. Admittedly it was re-established, but not until much later, and
then in a form which the East considered barbaric, namely as the Germanic Holy Roman
Empire with Charlemagne in the year 800, and Otto I in 962. Many would say that it had
become neither Holy, nor Roman, nor an Empire.
The Eastern Roman Empire, on the other hand, would endure for almost another thousand
years during which, having become the major world power, it would play a triple role,
politico-military, civilising, and religious. Constantinople, Antioch, and Alexandria
would prevail for centuries over Naples and Rome.
The characteristically Roman direction of history-the progression from West to
East-reversed, and the centre of the Empire shifted towards the eastern Mediterranean.
Few states have engaged in as many wars as the East Romans. Most of them resulted from
the geostrategic characteristics of Anatolia. Most of the invasions came from the
north-west, such as those of the Ouz, the Bulgars, the Slavs, and the Petchenegs. As they
gradually established themselves in the Balkans, they pushed back towards the west the
populations who were already inhabiting the two Roman Empires. Then, after these Empires
had collapsed, they fought or harried the Papacy.
The Eastern Roman Empire also had to defend itself on another front: Persia. There the
Sassanids had imposed Zoroastrianism as the official religion. Although this had triggered
extensive internal troubles, it did not prevent the Sassanids from having an aggressive
policy towards the West.
The struggle between the two most powerful states of the time was long and devastating.
The East Romans, menaced from the west, had also to withstand attacks from the rear.
Whenever the Emperor massed his defences to the east, the Balkan tribes immediately tried
to take advantage of the situation. It is therefore not surprising that the eastern
frontier of Anatolia was altered many times during the four centuries of Sassanid
dominance (third to seventh centuries).
Towards the middle of the seventh century, the Arab menace arose in the south-east. The
Arabs invaded Egypt and Syria, who at the time were in religious conflict with the Empire.
These two countries preferred Arab domination, and the religious tolerance it allowed, to
the incessant interference of an authority narrowly punctilious about religious beliefs.
After conquering Egypt and Syria, the Arabs repeatedly stormed the Anatolian frontiers and
arrived at the gates of Constantinople.
The characteristically Roman direction of history-the progression from West to
East-reversed, and the centre of the Empire shifted towards the eastern Mediterranean.
Few states have engaged in as many wars as the East Romans. Most of them resulted from
the geostrategic characteristics of Anatolia. Most of the invasions came from the
north-west, such as those of the Ouz, the Bulgars, the Slavs, and the Petchenegs. As they
gradually established themselves in the Balkans, they pushed back towards the west the
populations who were already inhabiting the two Roman Empires. Then, after these Empires
had collapsed, they fought or harried the Papacy.
The Eastern Roman Empire also had to defend itself on another front: Persia. There the
Sassanids had imposed Zoroastrianism as the official religion. Although this had triggered
extensive internal troubles, it did not prevent the Sassanids from having an aggressive
policy towards the West.
The struggle between the two most powerful states of the time was long and devastating.
The East Romans, menaced from the west, had also to withstand attacks from the rear.
Whenever the Emperor massed his defences to the east, the Balkan tribes immediately tried
to take advantage of the situation. It is therefore not surprising that the eastern
frontier of Anatolia was altered many times during the four centuries of Sassanid
dominance (third to seventh centuries).
Towards the middle of the seventh century, the Arab menace arose in the south-east. The
Arabs invaded Egypt and Syria, who at the time were in religious conflict with the Empire.
These two countries preferred Arab domination, and the religious tolerance it allowed, to
the incessant interference of an authority narrowly punctilious about religious beliefs.
After conquering Egypt and Syria, the Arabs repeatedly stormed the Anatolian frontiers and
arrived at the gates of Constantinople.
The frontier of the south-east, however, remained fairly constant at this time, with
the exception of minor changes which took place on the south coast of the Taurus, and
around Antioch.
To the east, Sassanian power being in decline, the Empire fortunately only had to
defend itself on two fronts, not three. (We leave aside the defence of southern Italy and
north Africa, which had only a minor influence on Anatolia, the heart of the Empire.)
The Ottomans would similarly have to fight on two fronts in the middle of the
seventeenth century.
The enormous area of both Empires rendered war on two fronts extremely costly in men,
money, and materials. Furthermore, the difficulties of movement and transport jeopardised
the very existence of the country, since while the army was at war on one front the other
was necessarily left undefended. To conclude hostilities in progress on one front and then
to hurry to the opposite front was an undertaking scarcely achievable in a single season.
Yet the maintenance of two separate armies was beyond the economic means of the Empire.
The prospect of one day having to fight on two fronts at the same time was therefore
always the nightmare of Eastern Rome. In this respect their situation was worse than that
of the Ottomans, who had succeeded in warding off the Persian threat by means of a treaty
drawn up towards the middle of the seventeenth century. The Ottomans would not again be
menaced by the Arabs, whereas the Romans of Anatolia had to struggle on all fronts to the
end.
This situation explains why, even at those times when they were powerful, foreign
armies were able to reach the gates of Constantinople. The Ottoman Empire experienced
similar dangers only rarely, and then only in the darkest hours of its decline.
It is easy for us to imagine the climate of anxiety in which the leaders and people of
this Empire had to live.
The epidemic of bubonic plague which occurred in eastern Anatolia around AD 550 caused
tremendous devastation throughout the Empire. This illness (which on a much smaller scale
resurfaced even during the twentieth century) killed a third, perhaps half, of the
population of Constantinople, leaving an insufficient number of peasants and soldiers.
Since the risk of war was undiminished, the leaders had no recourse other than to
diplomacy, and to seek allies against a possible aggressor. The imperial Governments
became so skilful at these manoeuvres that the expression `Byzantine intrigues' became
commonplace.
It is worth noting that, during the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the population of
Anatolia was similarly stricken by another scourge, this time malaria.
The Eastern Roman Empire experienced its golden age from the ninth to the eleventh
centuries under the Macedonian dynasty. Its frontiers during that period corresponded more
or less to those of the original Roman Empire before the division.
The Arab invasion had been halted, and the frontier with the Abbasids defined and
stabilised. Bulgars and Slavs were embracing Orthodox Christianity, a success which was
due to the invention of the Slav alphabet and the teaching of the Gospels in the Slav
language, whereas the Papacy had always insisted on the use of Latin.
Internally the administration had been centralised and bureaucratized and, the Senate
having been abolished, the power of the Emperor was limited only by that of the Orthodox
Church.
The agro-military system instigated by Heraclius, without equal in the West, began to
decline at the time the Empire reached its apogee. As commerce and industry were often
controlled in the public interest, the most profitable object of investment was land.
However, frequent famines obliged peasant-soldiers to sell their land if they could not
pay their debts.
The Government tried hard to check this dangerous development by legislation, but from
1025 the military aristocracy, which also constituted the class of great landowners, was
beyond control. Thus the peasant-soldiers, who had been the backbone of the Empire, sank
into destitution. History repeated itself in exactly the same way with the Ottoman Empire
between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries.
It was at this time that the Seljuks penetrated Anatolia from the east, while the
Petchenegs were attacking from the west. The advance of the Seljuks into Anatolia after
the battle of Malazgirt (1071) resulted in great losses to the Empire, both of
peasant-soldiers and of territories.
In the same year the Normans invaded southern Italy. The Empire therefore requested the
assistance of Venice against the Normans. Venice agreed, but only on condition that it
received in exchange certain commercial concessions. These were the first Capitulations.
The concessions enabled the Venetians to eliminate the competition which they had
experienced from the local trade, and laid the foundations of Venetian commercial
domination in the eastern Mediterranean. There is here another similarity between the East
Romans and the Ottomans.
Then the first crusade took place. One might think that it was intended to save the
Orthodox Christian Empire from the Seljuks. On the contrary, it reclaimed for the Franks
Jerusalem and the Holy Land which the Seljuks had captured in 1077! This was partly
because the final division of the two Churches, the outcome of a lengthy process, had been
an established fact since 1054, and partly because the Papacy and Europe had little
interest in the fate of the Eastern Empire except as a matter of form.
The most simple geopolitics reasoning would have concluded that the `liberation' of
Jerusalem, and its defence once `delivered', required Eastern Rome to be a stable and
powerful State. It was moreover agreed that the crusaders would hand back to it whatever
territories they won from the Seljuks. In fact, having taken Nicaea, they did return it,
though there was a change of heart when they captured Antioch.
Nevertheless, the first crusade was not without benefit for the Eastern Roman Empire:
the frontier with the Seljuks was pushed back to the centre of Anatolia.
The second crusade in 1147 ended in failure, for which the West held Eastern Rome
responsible. In 1176 the Seljuks, as at Malazgirt, again encircled and destroyed the
Eastern Roman army.
The third crusade was organised in 1187 to retake Jerusalem, which had been captured by
Saladin.
Richard the Lion-heart occupied Cyprus in passing, and the island was never returned to
the Empire. It should be remembered that in 1878 the British took Cyprus on lease, in
exchange for the aid they had provided the Ottomans, and that the island was never
returned! For the British, Cyprus was the object of a strange cupidity.
The failure of this third crusade, again blamed on the Empire, engendered in the West
the idea of capturing Constantinople. The fourth crusade achieved the taking of the town
in 1204. It was burned, pillaged, sacked; the soldiers even destroyed copies of Greek
classics, some of which were unique.
Venice had played an important role in the organisation of these crusades, allowing
them to retake or to acquire numerous warehouses and almost all the islands, including
Rhodes, Create, and Euboea, where she had been able to establish her commercial empire in
the Mediterranean.
The occupation of Constantinople by the Latins lasted until 1261. Even though the East
Romans succeeded in retaking the town, most of the Aegean islands and a large part of
Crete remained in the hands of the Franks and the Italians.
The Latin occupation was the most serious threat to the chances of survival of the
Empire. The Christian West, which should have been its ally, delivered blows that it had
been spared by its Seljuk enemies.
The Empire then began to disintegrate, and every attempt that the emperors made to save
it only hastened its downfall. To rescue its trade, which had been monopolised by Venice,
the concessions were annulled, but Venice then formed alliances again with the western
enemies of the Empire. When the Empire tried to improve its relations with the Papacy, the
people showed their disapproval.
The landed estates were seriously neglected, causing the Government to attack the
military aristocracy, the great landowners, who it held responsible. The Government was
thus itself responsible for destroying the last force capable of supporting it.
The most anodyne measures intended to reinforce the Empire provoked the mistrust and
hostility of the Papacy and of the Germanic Holy Roman Empire.
The lion had aged; it was dying. The less powerful, taking advantage of the situation,
went on the offensive: the Bulgars revolted, the Slavs proclaimed their independence.
This is an evolution which the Turks know well, for it was a similar series of events
that led to the fall of the Ottoman Empire. On reading again the story of Eastern Rome's
agony, they cannot avoid experiencing the same feelings of sadness.
These events prove that an allegedly shared religion has little influence on political
conflicts, and that barbarism is the monopoly of no one, even in matters of religion. When
the disintegration of the Empire was complete,-its `natural friends' would have
contributed in no small measure to its collapse. During their own long decline, the
Ottomans perhaps had the advantage over their predecessors of not being struck in the back
by false friends.
The fate of the Eastern Roman Empire is an obvious lesson of history to those today who
insist on the importance of one culture (that is to say, one religion) common to the whole
European community. It should be remembered too that, following the fall of
Constantinople, the bloodiest religious wars in the history of Europe erupted. At a time
when the Ottomans were considered to represent the mortal danger to Europe, it was in fact
these other wars, fought mainly between different Christian factions, which cost many more
lives than did the battles against the Turks.
Having retaken Constantinople, the Eastern Romans rebuilt it. They came to an
understanding with Genoa, an enemy of Venice. However, when the Emperor learned that a new
crusade was being prepared, he proposed an alliance with the Pope in order to prevent it,
either because the safety of the Empire was more important to him than the defence of
Orthodoxy, or because he was tempted by a simple tactical manoeuvre. The popular revolt
that broke out at the news of this intention was put down by force.
The Greeks living in Anatolia under Seljuk authority were unaware of this drama. Right
to the end they benefited from the religious tolerance of the Turks.
The Pope, however, did not believe the Eastern Romans to be sincere so in 1281 Charles
d'Anjou and a coalition of Venetians, Serbs, Bulgars, and Greek separatists invaded the
Empire. Had it not been for the revolt known as the Sicilian Vespers in 1282, it is
probable that the Latins would have achieved what they set out to do in 1204, namely to
gain control of Constantinople and the Empire before the Seljuks and the Ottomans.
A further word on the Capitulations. In 1296 a naval battle took place on the Bosphorus
between Venice and Genoa, while their future victim, Byzantium, looked on. Not long after
this event, Genoa started abusing the concessions she had gained to such an extent that
the Empire found it necessary to ally itself with the Venetians against the Genoese. This
alliance proved to be in vain, for Venice and the New Rome Byzantium lost the contest the
customs revenues of the Galata quarter of Constantinople, where the Genoese lived, at that
time exceeded the entire imperial revenues.
These precursors of the capitalist system, Venice and Genoa, were henceforward the
principal actors on the world political scene. They differed much from the ancient Great
Powers and had certain advantages compared to them. The Ottomans, who were no longer
evolving in a capitalist direction, would have to struggle not only against these two
republics but also against the whole of Europe.
The Seljuk danger gave way to the Ottoman danger from 1299. The Eastern Roman emperors
paid visits to several European countries, beginning with the papal States, but they
received nothing more than `good advice'.
Finally, on 29 May 1453, all the titles and powers of the Roman Emperor were
transferred to Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror, following his entry into Constantinople. He
thus became basileus. All the Eastern Roman lands passed under the sovereignty of the
Ottoman Empire.
A decree promulgated by the new Sultan made the Patriarch of Istanbul the head of all
Orthodox Christians. The Eastern Church was thus, for the first time, given political
power.
Conclusion
Rapid though it has been, this overview of the history of the Eastern Roman Empire
seems to point to certain conclusions.
Firstly, that the Empire was predominantly an Anatolian State. Anatolia constituted its
main territory, just as it was central to the Ottoman Empire. The other territories,
including that of Greece, were of only secondary importance. The Ottomans demonstrated
this point again later by reconquering virtually all the old Eastern Roman territories
outside Anatolia, whereas the reverse, the conquest of Anatolia itself, has not been
possible since Roman times. Head and heart of an empire with immeasurably extended
borders, Anatolia was committed to power, and even super-power, in order to compensate for
the geo-political weaknesses of that empire.
Secondly, the classical culture, after having survived the original Roman Empire,
disappeared during the Eastern Roman Empire under the influence of early Christianity.
Neither the Digest nor the Codes of Justinian, nor the humanist movement, nor the
conservation of classical texts in libraries constructed for this purpose, nor even the
fact that there were again scholars to study them, changed anything. Classical culture had
ceased to exist long before the arrival of the Turks in Anatolia.
Thirdly, the fall of Byzantium had been provoked much more by the Papacy and the
Catholic West than by the Turks.
Far from uprooting or persecuting Orthodox Christianity, the Turks on the contrary
protected it, and encouraged it to thrive. If the Latins (by `Latins' I mean Western
Europe and the Papacy) had captured Anatolia, the Greek Orthodox Church would not exist
today. It is because they were conscious of the Catholic menace that the Christians of
Anatolia and Rumelia offered the Turks only a token resistance, and in many cases even
received them as liberators.
Toynbee in his famous A Study of History lays down the universal laws which
govern history. He explains the genesis, growth, breakdown, and disintegration of
civilisations. He defines universal states as historical units which slow down the
disintegration process but which cannot prevent dissolution indefinitely. His intellectual
edifice seems impeccably applicable to almost all civilisations, but hardly to those which
appeared in Anatolia, for reasons I cannot yet fully understand.
He classifies both the Empire of Alexander the Great and the Roman Empire as Hellenic
universal states whose mission, or rather raison d'etre, was to save the Hellenized
peoples from the immense sufferings of the disintegration process. Yet he treats the
Eastern Roman Empire as a new civilisation, and dates its suicidal breakdown at ED
977-1019, i.e. the time of the great Romano-Bulgarian war which exhausted both contenders.
He then singles out the Ottoman Empire as the universal state of Orthodox Christianity.
If I perceive correctly, part of his problem arises from the fact that he concludes, in
line with his theory, that the universal church of Orthodox Christianity, born in the
universal state of the Roman Empire, actually changed the nature of the latter into one of
genesis and growth, so creating the new civilisation of Byzantium. This new Orthodox
Christian civilisation in its turn breaks down at the Romano-Bulgarian war, but is saved
from disintegration by the Ottoman Empire. He contends that Byzantium was not the
continuation of the Roman Empire, despite its claims.
In reality, all criteria point to the fact that the Eastern Roman Empire was a
universal state par excellence, and as such did represent the continuation of the
Roman Empire. The reforms initiated and implemented by Constantine were designed to stop
the disintegration process in the Roman Empire. These reforms re-established a centralised
order at the expense of social mobility and economic freedoms. They were like a
strait-jacket on society, because mobility between occupations, for example between
peasants, craftsmen, and tradesmen, was almost frozen, as was geographical mobility
between rural areas and towns and cities. Similarly, the Government intervened heavily in
the free market with various regulations. Ownership of land was based on class. The
consequence was an increase in production made possible by restored stability in the
political and financial spheres, though it did not result from enhanced individual and
social creativity which, by definition, is essential to the existence of civilisation.
On the other hand, the Eastern Roman Empire covered almost all the land area of the
Roman Empire, with the exception of some parts in the north-west. This resulted in a
multi-ethnic society with many different cultural backgrounds. The pax Romana (east),
which reigned over this vast area, attained its basic objective which was to prevent
internal warfare being triggered by disintegration.
The existence of Christianity as the State religion was the main difference between the
Roman and the Eastern Roman Empires, hence the naming of the latter as `the Christian
Roman Empire'. As a rule a universal state brings about a set of conditions necessary for
the creation of a universal church. Although this process started in the Roman Empire, its
principal development took place during the Eastern Roman Empire. One of the main
functions of the universal church, namely to preserve the germ of the characteristics of
the subdued societies as it were in a `chrysalis', was thoroughly fulfilled during the
Eastern Roman Empire and, as we shall see, also during the Ottoman Empire. This was
clearly illustrated when Greece became independent, and it was plain that the `Greekness'
of that society had not diminished over almost a millennium.
This fact applies equally to other societies under the rule of the universal state
within which religion served as a unifying force, while at the same time respecting the
ethnically features of the bodies social included in the empire. Indeed, one god together
with one emperor is the driving force behind the quest of the state for universality,
hence the attributes `unique' and `universal' of the Eastern Roman Empire. But this
attitude of the universal state puts it on a collision course with other powers resisting
its claims to universality, or simply making their own counter claims. Therefore, the
consequence is that the universal state avoids internal conflicts by replacing them with
large-scale external wars which its claims to universality provoke. Contrary to the growth
period of a civilisation, which creates a `limen' (a broad threshold beyond its frontiers
of friendly states influenced peacefully by its civilising radiation), the universal state
is surrounded, as in the case of the Eastern Roman Empire, by a `limes' (hostile external
environment) which makes external wars inevitable.
It is obvious that the universal state, whether or not called Hellenic, is a
fundamentally different sociopolitical system to the Aegean city-states. The free spirit
of the newly born individual of the latter was happily dormant in the former. No longer
was he creative but submissive to the Caesar-god of the Roman Empire. Having sacrificed
his classical culture, he was to become subservient to the Christian theocracy in the
Eastern Roman Empire. Fratricidal wars between unruly brothers (city-states) had died
down, for the eternal father, the emperor, reappeared on the scene of history in the image
of god. Wars between empires were waged for the supremacy of a religioideology, not to
determine who was best between brother city-states. Problems which were shelved or frozen,
since there was no creative solution available for them, brought about a stagnation in the
Empire, in the absence of the deadly struggles of the past between its components. The
inhabitants came to feel that the ecumenical state above race, culture, civilisation and
so forth was a world by itself, and that it was immortal, even timeless, because of its
internal inertia.
I have dwelt at some length on the nature of the Eastern Roman Empire as a universal
state, for I believe it prefigures the Ottoman Empire in this respect. Now let us revert
to the perennial question of the differentiation between East and West.
In the first centuries of the Christian era the distinction between East and West did
not have the political or moral significance which was attributed to it later.
The moral, rather than the geographic, differentiation between East and West, which
began with Herodotus, acquired a new dimension with the designation of the Roman Empire as
Byzantium. These terms, which initially referred to the respective locations of the two
Roman Empires, progressively came to be used to signify two different worlds. Because of
the rivalries between the Eastern Roman Empire and Catholic Europe, the concept of `the
East' gradually became charged with pejorative or negative connotations. However, `the
East' was first applied to the Orthodox Church and the Christian people of Anatolia, who
were labelled by Westerners as `perfidious Greeks', and not to Turco-Islamic Anatolia, as
is sometimes assumed today.
In the sight of the Orthodox Christians,.the Franks were `parvenu', cynically
exploiting brute force. On the other hand, the Franks regarded the Byzantines as mandarins
whose overweening pretensions were neither justified by merit nor backed by force. To the
Greeks the Latins were barbarians, to the Latins the Greeks were on the way to becoming
`Levantines'.
The decline of the Eastern Roman Empire increased in the West the negative feeling
behind the terms `East' or `Orient'. After the conquest of Anatolia by the Ottomans, these
words no longer referred exclusively to the Eastern Roman Empire and the Eastern Church,
but also to Eastern civilisation in general.
The expression `Asia Minor' was similarly imposed during the Roman period. As I
mentioned earlier, `Asia' originally denoted the western part of Anatolia, especially
Lydia. When `Asia' became the normal word in the West to mean the whole continent, the
East Romans used the term `Asia Minor' just for Anatolia, in order to distinguish it from
the rest of the continent. Hence two strongly negative qualities became attached to
Anatolia: that of `Eastern', and that of `Asiatic'.
Ever since then, the territory to the north-east of the Mediterranean, though always an
integral part of Mediterranean civilisation, has found itself relegated to the background
by an artificial separation of the continents, and by the pejorative evolution of the
words `East' and `Orient'.
Nevertheless, nothing can alter the fact that it was in this "East", in this
"Orient", that civilisation was born; it was there that the fundamentals of
science were discovered and developed; and it was there that a monotheistic religion took
root and prospered.
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