Selected Books
Turkey in Europe & Europe in Turkey
Turgut Özal

The 1980 Intervention and Turkey's Image

"Judge not, that ye be not judged."
Matthew, VII,1

After the founding of the Republic and the introduction of the reforms there had been a rapid increase in Turkey's prestige. The improvement was due more to the reforms themselves than to the departure of the large majority of Christians or to the fact that between the wars Europe had to occupy itself with its own economic problems and concerns about security.

By the end of the Second World War, Europe was spiritually and materially exhausted. Fascism, Nazism, and the Jewish holocaust had destroyed Europe's self-respect. There had also been the humiliation of having been saved by forces other than her own. Communism had been able to assert itself as a civilized force which had conquered Nazism.

The decolonization painfully achieved by some powers in the immediate post-war period, and the struggles undertaken by others during the next fifteen years to retain their colonies, had the effect of sullying Europe's image throughout the world. The discovery of the true face of Stalinism and the policy of the Iron Curtain permitted a measure of prestige to be regained at the expense of Communism, but the democracies did not succeed in winning the ideology battle. Until the beginning of the seventies Europe in general, and western Europe in particular, was in no state to concern itself with anyone else's image.

In the early seventies, human rights and democracy gradually became weapons in the ideological struggle against Communism. Human rights associations were established in many countries and related questions appeared on the agendas of international organizations. At the same time, unrest grew among certain ethnic groups. The European Community in particular became the arena for the struggle of the `mini-nationalities'. The ambitions of ethnic minorities and the ideology of human rights rapidly became confused.

The second half of the seventies witnessed the failure, not only of the communist system, but also, because of the global economic crisis, of the post-war model of society based on Keynesian economics and the welfare state. There was a return to the free-market economy. Social Democracy, which had failed in its policy response to this crisis was either converted to neo-liberalism or reduced to a few protest groups who supported ecology, disarmament, and human rights.

The lack of sufficient interest by the West in the development efforts of developing countries had adverse consequences for the Third World, which bitterly criticized the West within the framework of North-South negotiations. As for the communist economies, they ceased to appear as viable alternatives when, having in their turn encountered economic crises, they resorted to free-market policies in an attempt to overcome their problems. Furthermore, communist countries found themselves put on the defensive by Western pressure over matters of human rights.

In short, by 1980 the opinion that the West had of itself was reinvigorated and improved to such an extent as to be at a level comparable with that prior to the First World War.

This improvement was brought about by forces on the political right in the West which had provided the most effective response to the economic crisis.

Let us return to Turkey. The military intervention of 12 September 1980 took place because the State was no longer able to exercise its essential functions once political polarization had degenerated into armed struggle. The fact that some nine hundred thousand weapons were recovered gives an idea of the number of individuals involved in the terrorism. The subduing of a movement of this scale inevitably gave rise to some excesses and injustices. Both the terrorism and its suppression brought great sufferings upon the Turks and Turkey. This fact did not prevent Western and international authorities from accusing the Turks of violations of human rights and, in particular, systematic torture. Subsequently the emphasis was altered to the pressures and violence `supposedly' imposed upon ethnic minorities. The campaign on the subject of the alleged Armenian `genocide' has continued since about 1970. These diverse accusations gradually began to reinforce each other.

It was not long before we became aware of the disparity between the actual situation in Turkey and the accusations made by western Europe. It seemed to be more than just the result of propaganda activity by terrorists, anarchists, and separatists who had taken refuge abroad, or by the Armenians and Greeks. Our attempts to counter the false reports with the truth were not believed, or were quickly replaced by more false reports.

At first we thought that our return to democracy would put an end to this campaign of disinformation; yet it continued with renewed vigour after the elections of 1983. The strangest thing was that most of those who participated in the campaign gave the impression of being sincere. Those who accused the Turkish State did not mention the people, while those who looked down upon the Turkish people, directly or through Turkish workers employed abroad, did not refer to the State. The combined criticisms of both sides, however, amounted to a complete denigration of Turkey, its institutions and its people. Turkey's prestige had again sunk as low as its worst level during the Ottoman era.

Such an image has less to do with reality than with the pathology of those who embrace it. The mechanism of the negative identity' had been started again, and nothing Turkey could do was enough to satisfy her critics. Each new step towards democracy generated a new campaign to explain that we could never be democrats in the Western sense. Having lost their former social status and function, previous adherents of social democracy and communism began to show particular aggression and vehemence towards Turkey among others.

The causes for this return to the `negative identity' must therefore be sought firstly in western Europe itself. Although there was no longer any question of crusades, of Turkish expansion in the Balkans, or the struggle for independence by the Balkan Christians, the media still represented the Turk as having been guilty of genocide in the past and perhaps capable of it again in the future, whereas the European was, at least implicitly, personified as good and virtuous.

We were once again in an atmosphere of complete Manicheism, the assumption of which was that `No compromise is possible between good and evil; one of the two must triumph and the other be vanquished', an attitude known to appear during great international crises.s Now there was just such a crisis at that time and also, as I have just indicated, the left-wing faction, active participants in the campaign, were themselves in crisis. However, was there another crisis in western Europe which would explain why Turkey was used as a scapegoat?

A cursory look at western Europe shows us that many of the powers of national governments are gradually passing to a supranational authority within the framework of the European Community. The instruments of macro-and micro-economic policies available to individual nation-states had already lost much of their efficiency in the process of international integration. This process, which is likely to have major consequences, seems to signal the beginning of the desegregation of the nation-state within the EC; hence the increase in the importance of provinces and ethnic sub-groups who have begun to fight to obtain recognition of their rights. It is they who must be the building blocks with which the new Europe is constructed. Expatriate workers, by their very numbers, constitute another ethnic sub-group.

European governments have been trying to resolve the difficulties created by this evolution in conformity with democratic rules and while respecting human rights. However, the diffuse feeling of insecurity created by the idea of the disintegration of the national State has revived deep-seated atavistic feelings such as fear and hate, which in turn have led to the creation of extreme right-wing movements and the reappearance of racist attitudes. Western Europe has been badly frightened by this resurgence and, though remote, the possibility that history could repeat itself.

The result is that Europe, while denying that it has any feelings of hatred towards ethnic sub-groups and foreign workers, has, as a defense mechanism, projected those same feelings on to the Turks, alleging that Turks hate the minorities in Turkey. Was not the first genocide of the century committed by Turks rather than Europeans? It was happening again. Turkish denials were not to be taken seriously; besides, their democracy was only a sham, a farce. Turks must therefore be kept outside Europe, that is to say, consigned to the outer darkness.

A Foreign Ministry report conjectured in 1984 that the human and minority rights groups in the European countries, where extreme-right political organizations and racist tendencies were rampant, would be more predisposed to criticize Turkey on the same ground. I contend that, to a certain extent at least, activities of human rights groups aimed at violations in countries other than their own are defensive in nature, and that if they are to win their battle at home they should face their own reality.

I would sooner not dwell on this point. Men of good will are uniting on all sides to check this irrational campaign in Europe, but Turkey has been profoundly affected by it. Her prestige has been damaged through no fault of her own.

We are being encouraged to undertake a propaganda campaign to make known our true face. However, for this to succeed it would be necessary for Europe to become aware of her own motives and to accept responsibility for restoring Turkey's reputation.

As Europe grapples with her own difficulties, she must avoid falling into the trap of Manicheism. It seems to me that to admit Turkey as a full member of the European Community would be the simplest way to achieve this. Turkey is not alien to Europe, as is the popular belief, but is her alter ego, her `complementary identity'. If Europe can embrace Turkey, she will be at peace with herself; she will see herself honestly at last. Her ethnocentricity will have come to an end; her conception of history, her foreign policy, and her outlook on life will effectively have become secular. She will enjoy a truly global and humanist perspective, in which the pejorative distinction between Christians and others will have disappeared. She will understand the precariousness of our civilization in present circumstances, and will be able to exercise the vigilance necessary to prevent the re-emergence of the primitive sentiments latent within herself and each of us.

Without doubt this is the greatest contribution that Turkey could bring to the peace and grandeur of Europe, and it would happen simply by her presence within the Community.

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